Near the end of Richard Dawkins’ “The Blind Watchmaker” he presents a fictional debate between a “Real-life” and “Caricature” Darwinian. The caricature says that selection didn’t favor bats having wings like angels (which are separate from their arms). As human beings we assume arms are for manipulation (like Waldo), for most animals they are for locomotion and wings take care of that. Furthermore, breathing fire like a dragon would be quite costly (and likely dangerous), and a cow jumping over the moon would be signing its death-sentence (in addition to terminal velocity being quite costly to obtain). I know there are some good evo-devo type arguments about the constraints of past development, but Dawkins doesn’t seem good at coming up with good examples.
I was going to note something off-topic, but on further thought I think it is on-topic. Opening a pdf a few minutes ago I noticed one I have opened yesterday but not read any of*. It was about the original meaning of “cruel and unusual”, with an emphasis on the latter adjective. I had heard before that the phrase was a legal term of art dating back to Freeborn John, but I can’t remember where I had come across that either. How is that on-topic? In reading Orin Kerr’s Constitutional Theory Debates in a Nutshell (Or a Lot of Them, Anyway) I saw that the sticking point was that originalism would force us to adhere to antiquated and extremely unpopular views, a bullet I’ll openly bite. In a literal sense, I don’t resemble Kerr’s caricature, since it is of a “faint-hearted” originalist, but I do resemble the reductio presented by the hypothetical anti-originalist. One thing I’m surprised few originalists mention is that to the extent such policies are unpopular, we should expect basic majoritarian politics to do as able a job as the court in restricting their use. The question of why we should expect courts to do a better job is rarely asked. One could argue that, like the senate, obstruction is a virtue all its own even when the obstructors are not much better than the obstructed, but the senate is unpopular enough that few think there is anything positive to imitate.
*I still haven’t read much of it, or the second paper I’m linking to here. It also occurs to me that this new interpretation suffers from the same ratchet-effect terminating in a null set of available punishments that originalists complain about for the “evolving standards” version. But a bullet-biter should be able to say that we can use the amendment process when we get to that bridge.
August 17, 2010 at 10:19 pm
And what about the clause restricting “excessive bail”? Don’t we violate that all the time with bail routinely set at millions of dollars? I’m fine with either following the constitution as written, or adapting it as we see fit. But taking bits and pieces according to judicial whim makes no sense.
In any case, as Graeme Wood’s latest article (http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/09/prison-without-walls/8195/) in The Atlantic makes clear, GPS tracking really should replace bail, and much of the judicial system in general.
Also, speed limits are commonly justified on the grounds that risky drivers generate an externality to others and need their behavior restricted. They pay for their own accidents, but not for those of others. Yet this could be fixed entirely by imposing ex post fines after accidents based on the riskyness of the driver, potentially levied on mandatory deductibles.
Final thought: as accident-prevention technology improves, we need to raise DUI limits. Being able to drive while being more drunk is a serious welfare gain of that technology.
August 17, 2010 at 11:24 pm
Hmm. I find it a bit scary that people who think like Kerr have as much influence as they do.
It never seems to cross his mind at all that if “A1 is not just unacceptable but neanderthal”, the proper solution is not for judges to “re-interpret” it, but for the Constitution to be amended via its lawful amendment process.
This guy is a law professor? Depressing.
August 22, 2010 at 10:46 pm
A bit late, but Kerr defends his stance here.
August 18, 2010 at 3:24 pm
Re: past examples:
I vaguely recall giraffe neck circulation being a good example of developmental constraints. But I don’t remember the details.
Well, of course the ‘unusual’ part is going to be stressed. If the government were prohibited from conducting punishments that caused suffering, it wouldn’t be able to punish at all!
August 18, 2010 at 8:46 pm
I’ve been a fan of Mark Kleiman’s theories on crime since I saw him on bloggingheads. Glad to see these ideas are picking up.
It might be easier to catch large numbers of drivers before they have accidents than hope to get more perps than hit-and-runs. But realistically I think tickets are mostly about revenue-generation these days.
flenser, Kerr’s dialogue was intended to be descriptive rather than prescriptive. He did acknowledge himself to be a stare-decises guy though. I have enough burkean in me to respect the appeal of stare decisis, but I still view the text as controlling. Ideally, judges would follow the constitution and so adhering to precedent would result in continued adherence (and my guess is that today overturning precedent is more prone to lead further away from original meaning). At the same time though, ideally the legislature would adhere to the constitution and it wouldn’t be necessary for the court to strike down their acts. I wrote more about this sort of thing in my posts on judicial minimalism & restraint.
I don’t think “cruel” was defined back then as “causes suffering”, at least as it applied to punishment.