Maybe that’s all one last name, and a common one. Via the new poli-sci group blog the Monkey Cage:

The model developed in this study yields three key results. First, it suggests an explanation of the observation that government concessions often lead to an increase in the militancy of terrorist organizations. Namely, concessions draw moderate terrorists away from the terrorist movement, leaving the organization in the control of extremists. Second, it provides an answer to the question of why governments make concessions in light of the increased militancy they engender. The government’s probability of succeeding in counterterrorism improves following concessions because of the help of former terrorists that directly improves counterterror and leads the government to invest more resources in its counterterror efforts. Thus terrorist conflicts in which concessions have been made are more violent but shorter. Third, it demonstrates how the ability of former terrorists to provide counterterror aid to the government can solve the credible commitment problem that governments face when offering concessions.

Ethan Bueno de Mesquita’s webpage at the Harris School at the University of Chicago is here, the paper quoted is here. I mentioned the more well-known Bruce Bueno de Mesquita here, Arnold Kling called him a “data molester” here, his proposal to incentivize peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was highlighted here, and a presentation I like to link to on the system disruption Israeli counter-terrorism organizations engage in is here. Scott Atran bums out rationalists/utilitarians by claiming both sides will have to give up something of symbolic importance here.